mapzorfandomcom-20200216-history
Barvos United Nations Constitution
1. Founding and Principles The UN constitution is the highest law of the UN and may only be ammended as described in section 3. The UN shall serve to uphold international stability and co-operation 1.1.The UN shall observe and uphold the Treaty of Toastervision . 1.2. The UN will enforce a ban on WMDs 1.3.UN will be seated on the island previously known as Ayrarad. Upon foundation, Artiria will donate the west half of its territory on the island west of the river on which the cities of Esterriver and Pripyat sit. 1.3.1. The city of Innovia will be renamed and Innovia will relinquish any claim to the city. It will be named Adelet and be the seat of the ICJ 1.3.2. The coastal city shall be named Nippy Port 1.3.3. The town between the coastal city (Nippy Port) and what is currently known as Innovia city (Adelet) will be named Lanivale 1.3.4. Ayrarad city will be named Ayralad 1.3.5. The Ark's remains in Ayrarad are to be respected, documented and maintained as a site of great historical, cultural and scientific importance with the same care delivered by Artiria. 1.3.6. The Island as a whole shall be named Lobster Rock 1.4. Flag Two official versions of the flag will exist with the two UN colours of Azure Blue and White, a simplified version as below alongside a version in which each full member is represented with a 5 point star, each nomial member with a 4 point star and each UNAT with an 8 point star. The full version takes precendence and importance over the simplified version. 1.5. The UN may hold UN Administered Territories as a collective responsibility if approved by the BUNGA 1.6. The UN may have temporary holdings of territory (UNTH) but unless the BUNGA accepts it, the UN must revoke its claim. 1.7. Military action against the UN, UN territory or UN personel will be considered against international law 2. Membership and Contribution 2.1. All state representing a nation with unique strong vibes will be allowed a membership, no two groups with the same vibe are allowed to participate simultaneously. 2.1.1. If two applicants attempt to join with the same vibes the BUNGA must vote on which should be accepted 2.2. A state meeting the requirements in 2.1 can not arbitrarily be refused membership upon its initial attempt to join, however should it leave or be kicked out for violation of BUN constitution then the BUNGA may refuse membership under 3.2.3. 2.2.1. A rejoining member also requires the blessing of the UNEC or ICJ if it was previously kicked out for violating international law or the constitution 2.3. A member state is entitled to 1 voting representitive in the BUNGA, 1 vote in the UNEC elections and 1 vote in the election of the supreme judge. 2.4. Nominal membership may be given to nations with weak unique vibes or shared vibes, these will be permitted observing representitives in the BUNGA but will not have a right to vote there. 2.5. Each member should provide 1* permanent military unit to the BUN Armed Forces (BUNAF) 2.5.1.During BUNAF operations, countries at peace should be prepared to provide up to 15%* of their military units and may volunteer more at the request of the BUNEC. The BUNEC recruitment for the BUNAF must be proportional across all member states. 2.5.2.To force entry into a member state's territory that is not already suspended or in conflict with the UN requires a warrant to have been issued from the supreme judge, this must be with a specific objective in mind as part of enforcing a specific international law. In addition the UNEC decision must be unanimous in order to do this. 2.5.3. If the summative target of this call to arms is not met (that is, that the lack in contribution by some nations is not met by extra volunteered forces by others), the BUNEC may suspend members not meeting their commitments. 2.5.4. (*) This is the initial number upon foundation, this configuration can be changed by a super-majority in the BUNGA as per 3.3.4. 2.5.5.Nations may forego their duty to supply units as described in 2.5 & 2.5.1. provided there is a collective surplus of units compared to the recruitment target or in other words another nation is providing the units on their behalf. 2.6. Every nation must produce its fair share to the BUN budget by contributing at least 2% of their national budget to the UN, though no nation can provide more than 25% of the BUN budget. 3. Legislation by the Barvos United Nations General Assembly Provided it works within the constitution, the BUNGA has supremacy within the UN in decision making and law making. 3.1. Laws, repealments and actions may be proposed by both voting and observing representitives, as well as by the UNEC, ICJ and any parties delegated this power by the BUNGA. A proposal must be made before Wednesday of a vote cycle. 3.2. The BUNGA has the power and duty to accept or reject proposals for laws, repealments and actions at the conclusion of each voting cycle (On saturday). An absolute minimum of 2 votes is required in addition to the following requirements. 3.2.1. An absolute majority (>50% of all full members) is required for a law to be passed at the conclusion of a voting cycle 3.2.2. A law with a simple majority from all present (>50% of countries voting on the proposal) may be passed on the conclusion of a second voting cycle. 3.2.3. The BUNGA can not vote to remove a law-abiding member and can not refuse an initial application as per 2.2. A repeat application may be refused by a BUNGA vote. 3.2.4. The reverse of 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. applies in that a proposal is rejected on the first cycle if an absolute majority of members vote against the proposal, and that a simple majority can reject on conclusion of the second cycle. 3.3. Extra Majority Requirements. Some types of proposal may require an absolute extra majority to pass, 2/3rds of all entitled members, as defined below. At the conclusion of a second voting cycle this can be an extra-majority of all members voting on the proposal. 3.3.1. Those related to Religion and Language within the UN structure 3.3.2. Changes to the size of the UNEC 3.3.3. For a law to have universal jurisdiction (i.e: beyond UN members) 3.3.4. Changing the military commitment levels of member states 3.3.5. Accepting donated territory as full UNAT status or giving away territory with this status. This excludes any seat of the BUN itself such as the BUNGA which would be a constitutional issue (see 3.4). 3.4. The BUNGA may also propose and vote on constitutional ammendments. These require an absolute supermajoirty of 75%. In other words 3/4 of all members with the right to vote must approve a constitutional change before it can be enacted. 3.5. Repealment Repealment of a previously approved law requires both an absolute majority and more votes in favour of its repealment than there were votes approving it into law originally. 3.5.1. If a proposal to repeal has an absolute majority for 2 vote cycles but does not meet the second requirement of having more votes to repeal than votes that approved it into law then mark the numerical difference between the votes, with each successive voting cycle take 1 from that number until that number is negative. 3.6. Abstention from a vote As well as being able to vote 'yay' in approval or 'nay' in rejection of a proposal, a nation's representitive may also vote 'meh' in abstention. This abstention for the purposes of the proposal's ballot calculus means that the total number of voting members is considered to be one less (and therefore less required for any absolute majority). 3.7. Secretarial Duties of the BUNEC Archiving information is a collective duty which the BUNEC is primarily responsible of. 3.7.1. To satisfy some of the above requirements proposals should be made with a date or election cycle number, the number of election cycles the proposal has gone through. 3.7.2. If passed, a proposal must keep these details recorded along with the number of votes Yay/Meh/Nay/absent. Rejected proposals may be recorded but there is no obligation 3.8.The UNGA should not be able to vote to attack a country unless it is in explicit violation of international law 4. The BUN Executive Council as the Executive The BUNEC will be voted on a minimum of 4 voting cycles, provided a members state has called an election. Once called, the election will begin at the conclusion of the current voting cycle and the end of the following one at which the new BUNEC will be sworn in with a ceremonial hokey cokey dance in the UNGA. Initially the BUNEC will have 3 seats (This must always be an odd number). The BUNEC has the responsibility and powers of enforcing UN law and constitution 4.1. Election of the BUNEC. Each member state gets one vote and may vote for its own representitive, the 3 candidates with the most support are elected to the council. The next BUNEC may be voted for without the election being formally called allowing the current BUNEC to continue indefinitely with their replacements known. The candidates may not also hold the role of supreme judge simultaneously. 4.1.1. Ties In the event of a tie in the voting, a candidate representing a state that was on the previous council looses. If there is still a tie as both do or do not meet this condition then do this but with succesful voters for the previous BUNEC. If there is still a tie then apply the above two steps to the BUNEC before the previous one. If all previous BUNEC data is exhausted and a tie still exists or there is ambiguity then the candidates must engage in a dance off. 4.2. Decision making of the BUNEC For decisions to be immediate the councillors must be unanimous. Otherwise if there is a majority they must act the following day with any exceptions being listed below: 4.2.1. Declaring War: If the BUNEC has a law or action they wish to enforce with the BUNAF 2 councillors must wait a voting cycle after the vote to attack. 4.2.2. Raising BUNAF forces from constituent members as per 2.5.1. requires a non-unanimous majority to wait half a voting cycle (wednesday). 4.3. Powers and responsibilities. The BUNEC has responsibility as BUNGA secutary and High Command of the BUNAF as well as internal and external diplomatic representitives of the UN. 4.3.1. The BUNEC is responsible for UNATs unless law states otherwise, though can not accept or give them away and may not make changes to areas seating the UN (see 3.3.5.) 4.3.1.1. The BUNEC may do what it likes with UNTH land if the BUNGA makes no move to claim it after 2 vote cycles. 4.3.2. The BUNEC may delegate responsibilities to other individuals from UN member states (This may be highly practical for the High Command role for example). 4.3.3. The BUNEC may persue and arrest violators of international law which includes the UN constitution, and may hand them over to the ICJ 4.3.4. The BUNEC may suspend a member for violating internation law, they may also revoke membership entirely if they are unanimous and recieve approval from the supreme judge. 4.3.5. The BUNEC may revoke membership for violation of the constitution if they are unanimous, or if they vote a majority and have approval from the supreme judge. 4.3.6. The BUNEC may use military force, sanctions and diplomatic pressure to enforce international law as is appropriate 4.4. Removing a BUNEC An Absolute BUNGA majority is required to remove a BUNEC before the minimum election cycle, if an extra-majority (2/3) is not reached it also requires approval of the supreme judge. 4.4.1. Removal of an individual Councillor requires a extra-majority (2/3) and approval of the Supreme Judge 4.4.2. Removal of an entire BUNEC mandates an immediate election, the Supreme judge may delegate interim responsibility to 3 previous Councillors from different constituent states. These Councillors will not be able to make new decisions unless unanimous and may not initiate a war. Delegated powers may continue with the supreme Judge's blessing. 4.5. Replacing a Councillor after their Resignation, Suspension, Incapacitation or Removal. If an individual councillor is removed or resigned for whatever reason, such as their state being suspended from the UN, the replacement councillor will be selected by random sortition of all states that did not vote for the other 2 councillors. In an emergency the supreme judge may appoint a councillor provided they do not have the same vibes as the other two councillors. 5. The ICJ: International Court of Justice The ICJ is chaired by the Supreme Judge (and his/her deputiy) are responsible for overseeing justice, bringing fair and impartial interpretation of the law and providing a constitutional counter-balance to the UNEC, bringing stability to the UN. In contrast to the inherently factional UNEC, the Supreme Judge is meant to be fairly independent are more loyal to the UN itself. 5.1. Appointment of a Supreme Judge. Countries with representitives seeking to take the role of supreme judge opt into a list (which is randomised on the UN's founding) and the position is taken up by countries on the list in a cycle. New countries are put on the bottom of the list, suspended countries have to re-opt in. 5.1.1. The position of deputy is assigned to the Supreme Judge's successor on the list of appointees 5.1.2. Removing a Supreme Judge requires an absolute 2/3 in the BUNGA or an absolute majority with UNEC approval. 5.1.3. Should a judge not be available to take up the position, the BUNEC councillor with the most votes from the election (with tiebreakers as per 4.1.1.) Becomes the interim supreme judge until an election is completed and 4.5. is invoked. 5.1.4. To be inaugurated the judge must go to the BUNGA where they will dunk a hobnob into a ceremonial teacup, say the pledge and then remove the hobnob from the tea and eat it (if the BUNGA allows, other hot drinks may be allowed). If the hobnob does not retain integrity in this process the inauguration is considered incomplete, and they must repeat this ceremony until they are successful. 5.1.5. Pledge The candidate takes the Hobnob of Integrity and dunks it into the Tea of Justice, then repeats the following pledge. "I, (name, dunk biscuit), hereby pledge to uphold the values of justice, integrity and honor to the highest possible level. I, (name, dunk biscuit), pledge to serve neither my own interests nor those of my nation, but to be beholden solely to the needs and desires of the nations of Barvos as a whole. I, (name, dunk biscuit), pledge to devote myself to the position of Supreme Judge to the best of my ability." If at any time the Hobnob of Integtiry dissolves or breaks apart into the Tea of Justice, this is to be taken as a sign that the candidate's resolve must be strengthened and they are to be given a new Hobnob of Integrity and must repeat the pledge from the beginning. 5.1.6. The term of a supreme judge is 10 Voting cycles 5.2. Trials A Trial may be enacted with either a standard trial with evidence and a jury, or trial by combat. This may be down to the specific law or the choice of the supreme judge. The BUNGA should also be given a vote cycle to be able to contest the Judge's choice of trial 5.2.1. If the Supreme Judge's election campaign included promises to adhere to a particular trial type, however, the BUNGA may not have a say in his choice. 5.2.2. In trial by combat, the supreme judge picks the prosecutor or 'champion'. 5.3. Punishment Laws may state the appropriate punishment (this can include death), otherwise the judge may interpret the appropriate punishment (though may not enact capital punishment unless the law explicitly states it is appropriate for the crime in question). On the other hand the results from Trial by combat are obviously freedom or death. 5.4. Mediation The BUNGA may reccomend that an international dispute be debated and resolved in the ICJ under the Supreme Judge's supervision. 5.5. Interpretation On law votes at an impasse when the constitution does not set a precedent for how to treat a proposal, the judge may make the decision to accept or reject the proposal. The Judge however may not do this on matters of constitution and can only reject such proposals. History of amendments 30th August 2015: The UNGA should not be able to vote to attack a country unless it is in explicit violation of international law 12th December 2015: reduce the term of the supreme judge from 15 cycles. The term of the supreme judge should be reduced from 15 cycles to 10, this amendment will not apply to the incumbent judge's (Judge Dredd, 1st term) term of 15 cycles. 12th December 2015: Treat Nay votes in the same way Yay votes are in regards to the rules regarding absolute majorities The constitution specifies rules required for a proposal to pass in 3.2.1 and 3.2.2. though is silent on conditions for a proposal to be rejected. This amendment seeks to clarify this by codifying what is implicit: that rejection conditions work the same way: if an absolute majortiy of UN members vote Nay then the proposal is rejected on the first voting cycle, and that a simple majority of nays rejects the proposal on the second cycle. Category:UN Category:BUN